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Abstract
Psychoanalysis ushered in this century. Will its influence on developmental psychopathology end in the next? The
paper explores some critical obstacles in the way of psychodynamic research, including the fragmentation of
psychoanalytic theory, the relative independence of theory from its clinical and empirical base, the predominance of
inductive scientific logic, the polymorphous use of terms, the privacy of clinical data, the dominance of the
reconstructionist stance, and the isolation of psychoanalysis from psychology and neurobiology. Notwithstanding
these limitations, core psychoanalytic precepts are not only consistent with some of the most important advances of
the last decade but may also be helpful in elaborating these new discoveries in the next century. Psychoanalysis is
centered on the notion that complex, conflicting, unconscious representations of mental states constitute a key facet
of normal and abnormal development. This notion retains its power, and deserves a prominent position among the
major frames of reference to guide developmental science in the next century.
The future of psychoanalysis, if it is to have a fu- logical support, that any body of knowledge
ture, is in the context of an empirical psychology, built on Freud’s dubious insights is likely to
abetted by imaging techniques, neuro-anatomical disappear into quicksand, and that “despite
methods, and human genetics. Embedded in the
some well-intentioned efforts at reform a
sciences of human cognition, the ideas of psycho- pseudoscience is what psychoanalysis has re-
analysis can be tested, and it is here that these
mained” (p. 55).ideas can have their greatest impact. (Kandel,
Attacks on Freud’s corpus are by no means1998, p. 468)
new. John Watson (1930) predicted that “20
years from now an analyst using FreudianFew would question that psychoanalytic the-
concepts and Freudian terminology will beory, and particularly Freud’s ideas, have ex-
placed on the same plane as a phrenologist”erted a profound effect on 20th-century
(p. 27) and thus ushered in what is generallythought; an equally small minority would con-
regarded as the heyday of psychoanalyticsider its impact on the 21st century as assured.
ideas. However, the pervasiveness and inten-There have been numerous obituaries of psy-
chodynamic thinking over the past decade sity of recent critiques cannot be shrugged off
(Gru¨nbaum, 1984; Webster, 1995). Frederick even by the most committed Freudian zealots.
Crews (1993) is perhaps representative. Before a psychodynamic approach to devel-
Crews asserts that psychoanalytic theory is opmental psychopathology can move into the
without significant experimental or epidemio- next century, it must deal with the challenges
it faces and undertake radical reappraisal of
its epistemic framework. It is argued herein
that if such a reorientation is possible, the
Address correspondence and reprint requests to: Peter psychodynamic approach could make a timelyFonagy, PhD, Psychoanalysis Unit, University College
and significant contribution to the progressionLondon, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK; E-mail:
p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk. of ideas in developmental psychopathology.
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Critiques of the Psychodynamic Approach pression as we do so that we have a tool for
understanding that not only makes sense to usThe difficulties faced by psychodynamic but also works for our patients and is further-
thinking are both external and internal. Exter-
more scientific.2
nal challenges include poor evidence of treat- There are several conditions that should be
ment effectiveness; the building of develop-
met for the accumulation of clinical observa-
mental theory from retrospective accounts tions to become a genuinely adequate basis
extrapolated from a clinical population; per- for psychoanalytic theory. These are: (a) a
vasive gender, cultural, and ethnic biases; the
clear logical tie between theory and tech-failure to integrate data from the biological
nique, so that the inevitable contamination of
and social sciences; and a focus on the indi-
observations by technique can be identified
vidual to the exclusion of social and cultural
and studied; (b) deductive as well as induc-forces. As these external challenges are quite tive reasoning in relation to clinical material;
well publicized (Frosh, 1997), this review will (c) the unambiguous use of terms in labelingbegin with the internal battles that need to be
clinical observations; (d) a willingness to ex-
addressed if psychoanalysis is to remain influ- pose more clinical work to detailed scrutiny
ential in the 21st century.
and, therefore, to different theoretical per-
spectives; (e) reconsideration of the recon-
structionist approach, since there are logicalInternal problems
pitfalls in building theory on the basis of re-
Over recent decades psychoanalysts have wit- membered events; and (f) good contact and
nessed an increasing fragmentation of theory. collaboration between psychoanalysts and
Arguably, the major psychoanalytic schools those working in neighboring disciplines. We
that emerged following Freud’s death, and think it is vital that psychoanalysis should not
that have organized the discipline since (Fo- continue to insulate itself from related fields
nagy, Target, Steele, & Gerber, 1995), are of work; there is much to be learned from
breaking apart. This fragmentation, euphemis- both sides, as we strive to indicate. None of
tically discussed as pluralism, could on its these criteria has yet been adequately met, and
own spell the demise of psychoanalysis. in the following sections we discuss some im-
Why might this happen? Elsewhere (Fo- plications of this situation.
nagy, in press) we have argued that a major
problem with psychodynamic theory building
Psychodynamic clinical practice is notlies in its relationship to clinical practice. Psy-
logically deducible from any psychoanalyticchoanalysts have always argued, and we
clinical theoryagree, that psychoanalytic treatment provides
a unique window on human behavior and ex- Psychoanalytic technique is not logically con-
perience, which generates developmentally nected to theory (e.g., see Berger, 1985); there
rich and clinically powerful accounts. The are several aspects to this, some of which are
main function of theory for practitioners is in touched on below.
explaining clinical phenomena. The weakness
of such clinical theories is their extensive reli- 1. Psychoanalytic technique arose largely on
ance on induction.1 A theory is used as a the basis of trial and error, rather than hav-
heuristic device rather than as a tool for de-
duction. The clinical usefulness and persua-
2. In fact, most clinical laws are, in any case, only proba-
siveness of inductive arguments can lead us, bilistic (Ruben, 1993). Therefore, they could allow
with the greatest of ease, to raise the status of only inductive statistical explanations rather than de-
“clinical theories” to laws, gaining the im- ductive–nomological ones (see Carl Hempel’s 1965
Covering-Role Model). While we know that child mal-
treatment can give rise to behavioral disturbance, this
is by no means inevitably the case (e.g., Cicchetti &1. There is some truth to the quip that psychoanalytic cli-
nicians understand the word data to be a plural of the Rogosch, 1997; Cicchetti, Rogosch, Lynch, & Hoot,
1993).word anecdote.
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ing been driven by theory. Freud (1912) not for the relative independence of theory
and practice.willingly acknowledged this: “The techni-
cal rules which I am putting forward have
been arrived at from my own experience in Inductive rather than deductive reasoning is
the course of many years, after unfortunate
used in relation to clinical material
results had led me to abandon other meth-
ods” (p. 111). The predominant theory-building strategy in
clinical psychoanalysis is “enumerative in-2. There is no one-to-one correspondence be- ductivism” (the accumulation of instances
tween differing psychoanalytic frameworks
consistent with a premise). In treating a pa-
and the techniques used. It is as easy to il-
tient, we have access to a set of observations,lustrate how the same theory can generate
certain of which are selected as telling. Fromdifferent techniques as how the same tech-
these the analyst draws conclusions about
nique may be justified by different theories how the patient generally behaves and why he(Wallerstein, 1992). For example, Gedo
or she does so. The analyst will be predis-(1979) states that “principles of psychoana- posed to focus on those aspects of the pa-lytic practice . . . [are] . . . based on rational
tient’s interaction which make sense in termsdeductions from our most current concep-
of existing theoretical constructs. Induction is
tion of psychic functioning” (p. 16). His
thus made not just from the accumulation ofbook claims that developmental problems
observations about a particular individual but
can be reversed “only by dealing with those
also from formulations of past cases by other
results of all antecedent developmental vi- psychoanalysts.
cissitudes that later gave rise to maladapta- From a clinical point of view this is useful.
tion” (p. 21). However, what sounds like a The difficulty arises from our understanding,deduction on closer examination turns out
as clinicians, of the role of theory. We con-
to be a hypothesis. It is one thing to pre-
sider it to lend credence to inductive observa-
sume and quite another to demonstrate that
tions because we assume that theories have
therapy requires developmental vicissitudes been inferred from a very large number of ob-
to be addressed sequentially. Many have
servations and subsequently tested againstpowerfully challenged the overuse of the
new, independent observations. What we candevelopmental metaphor (Mayes & Spence, find ourselves doing instead, however, is pil-1994) and, even from within the self-psy- ing induction on untested induction.
chology orientation to which Gedo belongs, Thus, theory is intrinsically contaminated
the support for his strong assertion is lim- by the technique used to generate observa-ited (Kohut, 1984, pp. 42–46).
tions. Theory has been shaped by what has
been found clinically helpful, rather than3. Theory and practice have developed at very
different rates, with practice changing only practice being dictated by what is true about
the mind. Thus, while theory is a vital adjunctin minor ways during the 20th century, in
contrast to the major strides made by theo- to clinical practice, neither has been used in a
way that would have helped to validate theries. It is quite realistic to contemplate a
single volume account that would encom- other. We almost certainly miss many in-
stances when the patient’s reaction is not aspass most major technical advances,3 yet no
single person could do justice to all the we would have anticipated on the basis of a
theoretical formulation, and we therefore doenormous theoretical developments that
have taken place over the same period. The not use the disconfirmations to improve or
discard psychoanalytic theories. Psychoana-discrepancy in rates of change is staggering
and would be hard to understand were it lysts are not alone with this problem. Not only
most clinical thinking, but in fact all human
reasoning shares this flaw (Johnson–Laird3. This has always been the case: only 1 volume of
& Byrne, 1993; Wason & Johnson–Laird,Freud’s 23-volume corpus is devoted to papers on
technique. 1972).
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To take a simplistic example, signs of un- challenge. Most of the concepts are private;
many of them (e.g., “splits in the ego,” mas-conscious anger—displaced onto the self and
away from someone ambivalently loved and ochism, and omnipotence) are complex and
abstract. However, while the clarification ofnow lost—are easily found in cases of depres-
sion, and Freud’s description (1915) remains terms is laborious, it is possible (e.g., Sandler,
1962). It is also essential if we are to findclinically compelling. But what of cases
where we can see the inward direction of out where theoretical differences are real, and
where they may only be imagined.anger, but it does not lead to depression? Such
cases could have been used to test and extend
the psychoanalytic theory of depression. To Allowing clinical observations to be
ask clinicians (and this applies not only to
shared and testedpsychoanalysts) to note and act on such nega-
tive instances, however, seems to introduce Clinicians’ narrative reports are necessarily
selective. We cannot expect any participant insomething alien to the therapeutic process,
setting therapeutic and research aims against an interaction to be unbiased, to introduce no
omissions and distortions. Far more importanteach other. Despite a few great exceptions
such as Freud, this confirmatory bias may be than bias, however, is that interactions are
largely governed by nonconscious mecha-fatal, in most cases, to the popular notion of
clinician as researcher. nisms, unavailable to introspection. There are
quite dramatic illustrations of this—Krause’sThis logical difficulty in selecting between
theories is the primary reason for their prolif- (1997) studies of facial expressions in face-to-
face psychotherapy, and Beebe’s (1997) anderation. As clinical observations are used in-
ductively by theorists who are themselves cli- Tronick’s (1989) work on mother–infant in-
teraction. The crucial information was nevernicians, new psychodynamic theories readily
emerge and obtain some confirmation. New consciously known to the participants, and
could not have been reported, only observed.theories are seen as supplementing rather than
replacing older ones (Sandler, 1983), so that There is a constant tension between mak-
ing reliable, accessible observations and intro-numerous partially incompatible formulations
need to be combined to provide comprehen- ducing an unacceptable interference into the
process. We must do everything possible tosive accounts. Thus, at any time psychoana-
lytic theory is like a growing family of ideas, gain informed consent, to protect confidential-
ity, and to ensure that observation createswith resemblances, relationships, and feuds. If
a psychoanalytic approach is to survive, then minimal distortion. These are, however, not
insuperable problems in other areas of psy-there must be ways of pruning this family
tree, so that the body of theory is strengthened chotherapy research and need not be so for
psychoanalysis (Jones, 1993).rather than continually branching out.
The ambiguous use of terms The reconstructionist clinical stance
Clinical theories of development are mainlyPerhaps in order to accommodate proliferat-
ing ideas, the definition of theoretical terms based on the accounts of people who have
sought help for symptoms or other life prob-has been left vague (Sandler, 1983). This is
neither unusual nor easily avoided. It is the lems, and who attempt to recall events that
occurred during early childhood, the most rel-way that human language and all human con-
ceptual systems deal with the complexity of evant part of which covers the preverbal
stages of development. There are two greatthe phenomena they represent (Rosch, 1978;
Wittgenstein, 1969). However, the absence of dangers here: firstly, of a logical fallacy in
assuming that something must have goneoperational definitions may obscure important
differences between theoretical approaches. amiss during childhood, and, secondly, of an
empirically discredited assumption that re-The definition of concepts in psychody-
namic theories admittedly poses a formidable membered events are “true.” (Psychoanalysis
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has contributed significantly to our knowl- disorder abhorrent to psychoanalysts (Ull-
mann & Krasner, 1969; Wolpe, 1969).edge about sources of bias that can strongly
distort early memories: see Brewin, An- Psychology has, of course, changed, and
now leads the scientific study of mental pro-drews, & Gotlib, 1993; Fonagy & Target,
1997.) cesses (Westen, 1999). Some changes particu-
larly relevant to psychoanalysis include theIt should not, however, be too readily as-
sumed that empirical data are necessarily development of (cognitive) therapeutic mod-
els in clinical psychology, which recognizemore helpful than clinical data in the con-
struction of a psychological theory. Westen the influence of nonconscious processes on
emotional states; the harnessing of technology(1991) points to the relative paucity of rich
theories within current psychiatry and psy- for the recording of interaction; and the devel-
opment of methods for studying transgenera-chology that are based on controlled studies.
Indeed, many psychological theories and em- tional influences on personality development.
The current generation of psychoanalystspirical investigations of psychopathology ex-
plicitly acknowledge their indebtedness to is returning to an appreciation of systematic
observational and developmental studies.psychoanalytic ideas. Clinical data offer a fer-
tile ground for theory building but not for dis- Such studies were begun by Freud (see Freud,
1909a, 1919, 1920) and were continued bytinguishing good theories from bad or better
ones. The convergence of evidence from sev- Anna Freud, Rene´ Spitz, Margaret Mahler,
Esther Bick, Donald Winnicott, and others.eral sources (e.g., clinical, experimental, be-
havioral, epidemiological, and biological) will However, these studies fell out of favor with
psychoanalysts when taken up by apparentlyprovide the best tests of the claims of psycho-
analysis (Fonagy, 1982). alien scientific disciplines. In the next cen-
tury, we can expect that developmental stud-
ies will be increasingly recognized as allow-Psychoanalysis has been too isolated from ing us to test psychoanalytic theories. For
neighboring disciplines
example, in the mid-20th century, Melanie
Klein was roundly condemned for making ex-Psychoanalysts over the last 50 years have at-
tempted to define their field independently of travagant claims for the capacities of infants,
but recent observational evidence of their cog-two major neighboring branches of scientific
activity: (a) psychology and (b) neurobiology. nitive capacities has given some support to
her ideas (Gergely, 1991).We believe that this insular approach now
needs to be challenged. There is a further problem concerning psy-
chological therapies. The pressure for cheaper
and quicker treatments has prompted somePsychoanalysis and psychology. Progress in
psychology has been largely ignored by psy- psychoanalysts to experiment with alternative
methods—briefer, more focused therapies,choanalysts, despite the fact that an increasing
proportion of psychoanalysts have received and special therapies for particular groups
(e.g., Malan & Osimo, 1992). The psychoana-their basic training in clinical psychology.
(Surveys of the profession demonstrate that lytic establishment, presumably concerned
about superficiality, has on the whole ignoredthe proportion of psychologists among psy-
choanalytic trainees increased to 25% from a these experiments. The gap has rapidly been
filled by alternative therapies, with often lim-negligible percentage over the last decade:
American Psychoanalytic Association, 1998.) ited observational or theoretical basis, bor-
rowing increasingly heavily, and sometimesHistorically, there were valid reasons for this.
Until the 1960s psychology espoused a posi- openly, from psychoanalysis (e.g., Ryle,
1994). Both the discoveries and the effects oftivist epistemology, was almost exclusively
concerned with behavior and was highly an- cognitive behavioral and even behavior ther-
apy are as easy to explain in terms of psycho-tagonistic to psychoanalysis (Eysenck, 1952).
As a result, clinical psychology embraced a analytic ideas as in terms of social learning
theory (Fonagy, 1989). It is regrettable thatsimplistic and mechanistic approach to mental
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more psychoanalysts have not tried to evolve have negated the reasons for this (Westen, in
press-a). Neuroscientists are no longer con-new psychotherapeutic techniques, rather than
sticking to a “one size fits all” principle. cerned just with cognitive disabilities or so-
called organic disorders (Kandel, 1998; Le-This situation has altered somewhat, and
the changes are very likely to accelerate. Doux, 1995a). If Freud were alive today, then
he would have been greatly interested in newMany American institutes of psychoanalysis
have started training psychotherapy candi- knowledge about brain functioning, such as
the development of neural nets, and the loca-dates, only some of whom are expected to go
on to full psychoanalytic training. Others have tion of specific capacities with functional PET
scans, and he would surely not have aban-accepted directly the challenge of alternative
therapies and are working towards either in- doned his cherished Project (Freud, 1895) to
develop a neural model of behavior. Geneticstegrating effective components of these into
psychoanalytically oriented treatments (Gold- has progressed, if anything, even more rap-
idly, and mechanisms which underpin andfried, 1995) or differentiating the effective el-
ements of each (e.g., Jones, 1997). sustain a complex gene–environment inter-
action belie early assumptions about con-
stitutional disabilities (Plomin, DeFries, Mc-Psychoanalysis and neurobiology. With nota-
ble exceptions, psychoanalysts have disre- Learn, & Rutter, 1997). In fact, for the past
15–20 years the field of neuroscience hasgarded the relevance of neurobiology to psy-
choanalytic ideas. The rejection of biology been wide open for input from those with an
adequate understanding of environmental de-was not arbitrary but reasoned—not political
but conceptual. Psychoanalysts were power- terminants of development and adaptation.
Sadly, the response of psychoanalysts hasfully influenced by Freud’s failure to create a
psychoanalytic neurobiology (Freud, 1895) been more defensive than welcoming of these
remarkable advances. The anxiety appears toand opted for a purely mental model based
around verbal reports of internal experience. be that hard-won psychoanalytic insights
could be damaged rather than enriched byIn the 1940s and 1950s neurobiology was
dominated by mass action theory (Lashley, new methods of inquiry (Green, 1999). How-
ever, there are encouraging signs that this is1929), which held that the cortex was largely
indivisible from a functional point of view changing; see, for instance, the excellent se-
ries of detailed papers on developments inand behavior could not be usefully studied
from the point of view of the brain. neuroscience published by the International
Journal of Psycho-Analysis in the last fewNeuroscientists were, by and large, uncon-
cerned with mental health problems, their fo- years, and the establishment of new journals
bridging psychoanalysis and neuroscience.cus being on deficits of cognitive functioning
rather than affect regulation. Psychoanalysis
began in radical opposition to a prevailing The Promise of Psychoanalysis
view that mental disorders represented a con-
stitutional irreversible vulnerability of the in- Given the limitations of psychoanalytic the-
ory, an obvious question is why develop-dividual. An unhelpful distinction between
so-called functional and organic disorders was mental psychopathology should concern itself
with this flawed and apparently outdated ap-then developed within psychiatry and other
mental health professions, which (although proach. We intend here to examine first
whether psychoanalysis is compatible withrarely scrutinized from this point of view) im-
plied mind–body dualism, again something new knowledge emerging from genetics and
other related fields, and whether its discover-Freud had rejected.
While—in terms of developing the disci- ies could be integrated with the progress be-
ing made elsewhere. Only if it is does it seempline with its focus on unconscious determi-
nants—it may have been helpful to isolate worth considering whether psychoanalysis
has additional features which entitle it to exertpsychoanalysis from the brain sciences, in the
last 30 years advances in all the neurosciences an influence in the coming decades.
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The challenge of genetics 2. The notion of nonshared environment in-
cludes two components: firstly, the extent
Over the last decade, research in genetics ap- to which key parameters within a shared
peared to have all but eliminated the place for environment may differ in relation to a spe-
a psychoanalytic account and refuted all theo- cific child, and, secondly, the extent to
ries that advocated the key role of early fam- which shared environments may be experi-
ily experience (see Scarr, 1992). There has enced differently by two children. Neither
been a claim that environmentally mediated of these pathways necessarily involves ge-
family influences were inherited and therefore netic mediation.
in themselves unimportant (Rowe, 1994) and
3. Neither twin studies nor adoption studiesthat insofar as family environment mattered,
can provide firm indications of the relativeit was specific to each child, even within the
importance of genes and environment.same family (Plomin & Daniels, 1987). It has
They provide estimates of individual differ-also been suggested that influences, pre-
ence within a population. For example,viously considered environmental, were actu-
while height is clearly heritable, changes inally genetically mediated (Kendler et al.,
average height over the past 100 years (in1996) and, further, that some genetically in-
excess of 1 ft for males) reveal that muchfluenced aspects of children’s behavior may
of the variability must be attributable to thehave been responsible for provoking observed
environment. Secular trends over the past
negative responses in parents and other people
50 years reveal a substantial increase in the(O’Connor, Deater–Deckard, Fulker, Rut-
prevalence of a number of childhood men-ter, & Plomin, 1998). Finally, all estimates for
tal disorders (e.g., antisocial disorder, sui-the heritability of psychiatric disorders in-
cidal behavior, depressive disorder, and
crease when lifetime risk, rather than point
misuse of drugs; see Rutter & Smith,prevalence, is used as an index variable 1995). Twin studies, where children’s ages(Kendler, Neale, Kessler, Heath, & Eaves,
are identical, cannot reflect the critical en-1993). All in all, a cultural shift characterizes
vironmental influences implicit in such sec-the last decade of this century, with both pro-
ular trends.fessionals and the lay public switching from a
primarily psychosocial model of child and 4. Heritability estimates are dependent on the
adult disturbance to a genetic–biological samples studied. Samples are mostly biased
frame of reference that a priori excluded con- and exclude environments that are most
sideration of psychodynamic aspects. likely to be associated with deviations of
A more balanced view of these genetic personality development. Gene–environ-
data was advanced by Michael Rutter and col- ment correlations imply that discrepancies
leagues (Rutter et al., 1997), and this has rees- between the environments of twins are
tablished the potential for psychoanalytic ac- likely, in any case, to be relatively small.
counts. The main features of this view are Cultural factors are also mostly partialed
out: if individuals from a variety of culturesoutlined below.
were to be included in the same study, our
estimates of the likely impact of shared en-1. Virtually all forms of psychopathology in-
vironment on personality would be very
volve both gene–environment correlations different (Mandler, 1997).
and interactions. However, these correla-
tions do not necessarily imply an etiologi- 5. Genetic effects may well be indirect as well
cal role for genetics. Individuals affect the as direct. Even a high genetic loading for a
environment and some gene–environment certain environmental hazard does not
covariance may be due to person character- mean that the consequences associated with
istics, irrespective of whether these person that risk factor would necessarily be geneti-
characteristics are genetic or environmental cally rather than environmentally mediated.
For example, if child abuse were found toin origin (O’Connor et al., 1998).
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have a large genetic component, its toxic turn be a function of either genetic or environ-
mental influences, or their interaction (Kan-effects would still be via the destruction of
trust in the abused child rather than via a del, 1998). Thus intrapsychic representational
processes are not just consequences of envi-purely genetic process.
ronmental and genetic effects—they may be6. Studies that attempt to exclude direct and
critical moderators. This has substantial clini-
indirect genetic effects still reflect the con-
cal significance, since the understanding of an
siderable influence of early experience. For
environment by the child is more readily
example, a study of adult female twins
modifiable than the environment itself, or thedemonstrated that a history of parental loss genes with which the environment interacts
through separation, though not through (Emde, 1988). A psychodynamic, intrapsy-death, was associated with adult vulnerabil-
chic perspective may be helpful in consider-
ity to depression and alcoholism (Kendler ing not just what precipitates a disorder but
et al., 1996). A recent well-controlled pro-
also which processes influence the course of
spective study showed that childhood mal- the disorder for better or worse.
treatment was associated with a 9-fold in-
crease in the risk of personality disorders of
Unconscious intentionalitya dramatic type (Johnson, Cohen, Brown,
Smailes, & Bernstein, 1999). The hallmark of psychoanalytic theory is the
attention to unconscious mental processes and
We believe that in general the challenge of unconscious motivation in the explanation of
genetics over the last decade has been a help- complex and often paradoxical human behav-
ful one for the psychodynamic approach. It ior. We suggest that knowledge concerning
has served to balance the naive environmen- unconscious mental processes and motiva-
talism of the second half of this century, tions could be integrated into the emerging
which culminated, for example, in the over- science of the mind, to which developmental
diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder psychopathology remains a key contributor.
among victims of childhood maltreatment and As some philosophers have relatively recently
gave rise to the unfortunate debate on false concluded, Freud’s brilliant insights may be
memories of abuse (Sandler & Fonagy, 1997). seen as extensions of common sense or folk
Psychodynamic theory, which is inherently psychology (Churchland, Ramachandran, &
person centered, has much to contribute to the Sejnowski, 1994) to unconscious mental func-
integration of genetics into developmental sci- tioning (Hopkins, 1992).
ence. The primary concern of psychoanalysis Cognitive neuroscience has shown that
is with the interaction of multiple layers of most of the work of the brain is nonconscious
representations in generating developmental (Kihlstrom, 1987). This is now known to in-
outcomes (e.g., id, ego and superego, part and clude not only memory acquired implicitly
whole object representations). Data from ge- (without conscious awareness; e.g., see Mil-
netics call for exactly such sophistication in ner, Squire, & Kandel, 1998) but also implicit
understanding the way genes may or may not aspects of thought, decision making, problem
be expressed in particular individuals. For ex- solving, and other cognitive tasks (e.g., Un-
ample, while risk factors operate in combina- derwood, 1996). Freud (1900), having recog-
tion, there is substantial individual variability nized the importance of this fact in the devel-
in response to stress and adversity. Much of opment of psychopathology, advanced two
this variability is poorly understood (Rutter, radical propositions which go beyond the cur-
1999), but it underscores the potential impor- rent position of neuroscientists. First, mental
tance of intrapsychic variables. Whether or health problems could be understood in terms
not the specific environmental factors trigger of unconsciously held mental states (beliefs
the expression of a gene may depend not only and desires; Freud & Breuer, 1895). Second,
on the nature of those factors but also on the effective treatment of mental health problems
could be undertaken if (and only if) the indi-way the child experiences them. This may in
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vidual suffering from mental disorder was models was wrong. We happen to believe that
both destructive envy and conflicting wishesmade aware of these unconscious, and by def-
inition maladaptive, beliefs or desires (e.g. for separateness and union are important ideas
for understanding mental distress. The prob-Freud, 1909b).
Freud’s arguments for moving the study of lem is one of trying to claim exclusivity for
any of these ideas. Here we are not pleadingmental disorder and its treatment to the level
of psychological causation were sound and re- for an integrationist model (Goldfried & New-
man, 1992). Rather, we are suggesting thatmain broadly consistent with research evi-
dence (see below). Unfortunately, he over- Freud’s original rich elaboration led later psy-
choanalysts to conflate the framework of psy-specified his model and moved beyond
general statements on the role of unconscious chological mechanisms implied by the theory
with the specific mental contents that he usedbelief and desire and attempted to specify
ideas that, in his view, commonly created un- to populate his intellectual framework. Un-
conscious conflict is core theory. Envy,conscious conflicts and led to problems of ad-
aptation (e.g., unconscious conflicts concern- oedipal rivalry, separation–individuation con-
flicts, and narcissistic traumata are elabora-ing toilet training; see Freud, 1905). In a
developmental context, Anna Freud (1974) tions at a different level—one of clinical ob-
servation—and are therefore too confoundedwent further and linked types of childhood
mental health problems and categories of un- with practice to permit deductive inferences
to developmental psychopathology.conscious conflict. For example, she was per-
suaded by clinical experience that childhood Where the psychoanalytic position remains
unique is in suggesting that motivational andphobias were associated with unresolved oe-
dipal conflicts and that obsessive–compulsive affective processes that influence develop-
mental processes may be unconscious. It isneurosis was related to the child’s uncon-
scious conflicts around early potty training. puzzling that this should be so since the role
of cognition in emotion and motivation is wellSuch overspecification of a good theory
had to be counterproductive. The range of established (Mandler, 1997), and, therefore,
almost by definition, affect and motivationpsychosocial experiences that reach a com-
mon symptomatic end point is probably limit- should be part of the “cognitive unconscious”
(Kihlstrom, 1987). Neurological evidence hasless (i.e., equifinality; see Cicchetti & Ro-
gosch, 1996). Similarly, the same experience been accumulating to suggest that neural path-
ways for emotion entail two sets of structures.may well lead to a variety of clinical manifes-
tations (e.g., Fergusson & Lynskey, 1996). One is via the thalamus to the amygdala
(which conveys primitive perceptual informa-Unfortunately, in overspecifying his theory,
Freud laid psychoanalysis open to endless re- tion with affective valence but without the
involvement of consciousness), and the othervisions and updating of aspects of theory
which were never core to his ideas (Fonagy et involves the activation of cortical centers and
deeper information processing prior to the ac-al., 1995). For example, the influential child
analyst Melanie Klein was struck by the ap- tivation of the amygdala (LeDoux, 1995b).
Patients with a variety of lesions who lose theparent destructiveness and cruelty manifested
by normal infants (Klein, Heimann, Issacs, & capacity for conscious discrimination may re-
tain the capacity to respond differentially atRiviere, 1946). She attributed highly complex
ideas (envy, paranoia, guilt, and the capacity the emotional level (e.g., Bechara et al.,
1995). There is evidence from nonneurologi-for denial) to babies under 1 year of age, and
saw these as central to later pathology. Oth- cal patients for unconscious affective prefer-
ences using low signal-to-noise ratio stimuliers, focused on somewhat later developmental
periods (e.g., Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, (e.g., Murphy, Monahan, & Zajonc, 1995).
Conditioned emotional responses may be elic-1975), specified key conflicts quite differently
(in this case, symbiosis, separation–individua- ited and even acquired (Wong, Bernat,
Bunce, & Shevrin, in press) outside of aware-tion, etc.).
We are not suggesting that either of these ness. Unconscious attitudes, particularly ra-
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cial prejudice, have been persuasively shown ies have demonstrated that when people act
on motives or preferences to which they haveto influence not only the speed of information
processing but also the reactions generated in no access, they will find reasons for having
done this which are both incorrect (Nisbett &independent observers (Fazio, Jackson, Dun-
ton, & Williams, 1995). Wilson, 1977) and likely to interfere with
subsequent task performance (Wilson &These and other findings, recently compre-
hensively summarized by Westen (in press-b), Schooler, 1991).
The value of the concept of unconscioussupport the view that emotional processing
occurs unconsciously in an automatic way. affect as motivation is strongest in explana-
tions of psychological disturbance. Psychoan-Preliminary data also support the view that
the unconscious processing of emotional in- alytic theorists assume that development, both
adaptive and maladaptive, is best understoodformation may be qualitatively different from
its conscious processing, in terms of the neu- in terms of the “competition, collaboration
and conflict among quasi-independent psy-ral mechanisms involved (Morris, Ohman, &
Dolan, 1998), its psychophysiological con- chological events” occurring outside aware-
ness (Westen, in press-a). Westen makes acomitants (Dozier & Kobak, 1992), and its
behavioral consequences (Greenwald & Ba- strong case that the psychodynamic model is
in line with contemporary connectionist ornaji, 1995). To the extent that unconscious as
well as conscious factors have a role to play, parallel distributed processing (PDP) models
in cognitive science (Rumelhart & McClel-then abnormalities in unconscious function-
ing, as postulated by psychoanalysis, will re- land, 1986). Both psychodynamic and PDP
models postulate multiple independent pro-main highly significant. Developmental psy-
chopathology will need to integrate this cessing units that work alongside each other,
at times in conflict, at times in collaboration,perspective on maladaptation.
to generate both conscious and unconscious
decisions. Within the PDP model, conflict isUnconscious motivation
an “emergent property” of the human nervous
system. The constraints placed upon the sys-Of course, admitting that affects may not be
conscious is not equivalent to stating that un- tem are both external (context dependent) and
internal (emotional and motivational). It fol-conscious mental states motivate behavior.
Although unconscious motivation is not gen- lows from the independence of neural cir-
cuitry underlying the generation of individualerally considered by developmental psychopa-
thologists, aside from those with preexisting mental states (beliefs, desires, fears, values)
that these states may be opposed to one an-psychoanalytic leanings, it is neither an ex-
travagant assumption nor one unsupported by other. It further follows from developmental
localizationist perspectives consistent withother sources of data. Westen (in press-b)
pointed out that the assumption that human PDP (Kinsbourne & Hicks, 1979; Schore,
1999) that several neural processing netsbehavior is simultaneously motivated by mul-
tiple goals implies that the logical mechanism emerge early and simultaneously in develop-
ment to perform the same psychological func-for organizing these must exclude conscious-
ness, because of the excessive demands these tion. This ensures plasticity and protects the
organism from the consequences of brain in-would make on working memory.
There is considerable evidence consistent jury.
In the course of development and the in-with this view. For example, intending to
carry out an action will lead to heightened ac- creasing involvement of specific brain loca-
tions with specific tasks, connections betweentivation of the information to be remembered
even when the intention is no longer con- some of these nets and processing units on the
periphery of the evolving system (at greaterscious, as evidenced by response latencies for
recognizing to-be-remembered items from a cortical distance from the point of localiza-
tion) will be increasingly marginalized (Edel-list (Goschke & Kuhl, 1993). A range of stud-
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man, 1992). As feedback to such systems is Early childhood experience
degraded by cortical distance, the processing
Of greatest direct relevance to developmentalcharacteristics of these vestigial systems will
psychopathology is the role of early childhoodnot be updated in line with neural nets that
experience in determining adult personality.are closer to the focal area responsible for
This has been a key tenet of all psychoana-specific tasks. These vestigial nets will there-
lytic propositions. The issue has been hotlyfore remain archaic in their functioning. Thus
debated within psychology (Rutter, 1999).conflict between the output of central and pe-
Reviews in the 1980s concluded that thereripheral processing units, with processing
were few serious long-term sequelae of ad-characteristics reflecting varying levels of ma-
verse childhood experiences that were clearlyturity, may be inevitable.
independent of later adversities (Rutter,Consistent with the notion of relative inde-
1981). Later research, however, demonstratedpendence of neural circuitry for a variety of
that early experiences did exert long-term ef-emotional and motivational states is the accu-
fects (Sroufe, Egeland, & Kreutzer, 1990), butmulating body of knowledge concerning the
these stemmed from (a) their contribution toneural circuitry responsible for positive and
the generation of further negative experiencesnegative affect states (Davidson, 1992; Gray,
(Sroufe & Fleeson, 1988) and (b) rendering1990). The complexity of interpersonal inter-
these individuals more vulnerable to suchactions, in terms of the concurrent presence
experiences (Rutter, Champion, Quinton,of both positive and negative affect, has been
Maughan, & Pickles, 1995; Suess, Gross-demonstrated (Hartup & Stevens, 1997). The
mann, & Sroufe, 1992). Psychodynamic the-development of cognitive–emotional struc-
ory might suggest that individuals with earlytures that resolve incompatibilities in emo-
adversity process their experiences differentlytional information processing represents a key
and proactively create experiences compatibledevelopmental goal. For example, in the so-
with past interactions (e.g., Caspi & Moffitt,cial referencing task, 12-month-olds respond
1995). There is evidence that individuals whowith distress and confusion if they receive
have encountered early adversity are moreconflicting facial messages from their two
likely to encounter both acute and chronicparents (Hirshberg & Svejda, 1990). The fail-
psychosocial adversities in adult life (e.g.,ure to resolve conflict in relation to the antici-
Champion, Goodall, & Rutter, 1995).pated behavior of the attachment figure is a
An alternative model of the relationship ofkey part of models of disorganized attachment
early experience and a predisposition to psy-(Lyons–Ruth & Jacobovitz, 1999; Main &
chopathology, fully consistent with Freud’sMorgan, 1996). Psychoanalytic models of
ideas (Freud, 1915), has emerged from the bi-psychopathology mostly entail the notion of
ological literature. Early stress (separationcompromise formation (Brenner, 1982). Neo-
from its mother) in the life of a rodent pupPiagetian developmental theory (Fischer &
led to enduring neuroendocrine abnormalities,Ayoub, 1994) also assumes that development
whereas appropriate caregiving responses tois a stepwise integration of independently
the pup’s distress led to a reduction in theevolving cognitive capacities.
pup’s hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA)Thus, both neuropsychological and devel-
response for the rest of the animal’s life (Le-opmental models are consistent with psycho-
vine, Haltmeyer, Kaas, & Penenberg, 1967).analytic ideas concerning the coexistence of
Intervening research has demonstrated that re-processing units from different developmental
sponsive caregiving serves, in the long term,stages, the ubiquity of conflict between them,
to reduce the pup’s fearfulness and vulnerabil-and the desirability of adaptive resolution of
ity to stress-related disease (Liu et al., 1997;these conflicts as part of the developmental
Plotsky & Meaney, 1993). Other studies haveprocess. Psychoanalytic theories of conflict
demonstrated that early adverse life experi-may have much to contribute to the study of
development in the coming years. ences in rats are associated with profound and
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persistent increases in gene expression for with other measures is most marked (Westen,
1991), is the emphasis on mental representa-corticotrophin releasing factor (CRF), not
only in the hypothalamus but also in limbic tions of relationships as mediators of self-
organization and as determinants of the im-areas (Nemeroff, 1996; Plotsky & Meaney,
1993). Independently, it has been demon- pact of the environment on the individual.
These representational structures are thoughtstrated that increased secretion of glucocorti-
coids over a prolonged period can lead to per- to mediate the experience of abnormal devel-
opment. The concept emerged originally inmanent damage to hippocampal neurons
(McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995). These data pro- the context of object relations theory, which
has developed rapidly over the past 50 yearsvide an underpinning for the traditional psy-
choanalytic emphasis on the lifelong impact (Fonagy et al., 1995). Numerous research
methods have emerged to explore psychody-of very early attachment experiences.
Whether early environmental risk is car- namic aspects of the child’s representational
world (e.g., Macfie et al., 1999; Oppenheim,ried forward primarily by the predisposition
to select adverse environments (Farrington, Emde, & Warren, 1997; Toth, Cicchetti, Mac-
fie, & Emde, 1997). There is accumulatingBarnes, & Lambert, 1996; Quinton & Rutter,
1988), by maladaptive affect regulation, by evidence to suggest that children transform
early interactions with primary caregivers intoneuroendocrine abnormalities, or by some
combination of the three is not yet clear. cognitive–affective schemas of self and other,
which regulate and direct subsequent behaviorHowever, all these models are consistent with
psychoanalytical ideas (Kandel, 1999). In fact (Bretherton & Munholland, 1999). These
schemata not only bear the imprint of signifi-the psychological mechanisms implied may
be the same regardless of the level of analysis cant interactions but also express the develop-
mental level which dominates the individual’s(social or biological): such mechanisms might
include unconscious biases in the processing functioning (Westen, 1990). According to
psychoanalytic theory, beyond representingof information, the absence of a capacity to
plan (Quinton, Pickles, Maughan, & Rutter, consensual reality, internal working models
contain the unique constructions of each1993), or distorted models of relationship rep-
resentation (Fonagy et al., 1996). There is ac- child. Representations are distorted by de-
fenses (Newman, Duff, & Baumeister, 1997)cumulating evidence that prolonged early and
severe privation, particularly the absence of and impulses (Westen, Muderrisoglu, Fowler,
Shedler, & Koren, 1997). These may be indi-an attachment relationship, may have irrevers-
ible effects (O’Connor, Rutter, & Kreppner, cations of a genetic predisposition or prior en-
vironmental experience. In either case, thein press). A counterpoint to these observations
is other evidence of the possibility of child’s distortion of the external world repre-
sents a significant challenge to studies aimingchange—so called “turning point effects”
(Caspi & Moffitt, 1993). Psychotherapy to find direct relationships between psychoso-
cial adversity and psychopathology. Psycho-would not be a viable option were it not for
evidence that “experiences in adult life make analytic object relations theory, with its focus
on idiosyncratic distortions, may be able toa decisive difference to people who have been
placed at risk as a result of adverse experi- make a significant contribution.
For example, Blatt and Blass (1996) haveences in childhood” (Rutter, 1999, p. 487).
The psychoanalytic focus on early experience proposed that a dialectic between two devel-
opmental pressures defines the evolving rep-has been demonstrated to be appropriate by
research, and its depth-psychological perspec- resentations of self-other relationships: the
needs for (a) a sense of relatedness and (b) ative may illuminate outstanding questions.
sense of autonomous identity. These develop-
Mental representations and object mental processes are thought to be in syner-
relationships gistic interaction throughout development and
a lack of balance implies psychopathology.A key aspect of the psychoanalytic model of
the mind, and the one where convergence “Anaclitic pathology” (an exaggerated need
Psychodynamic theory in developmental psychopathology 419
for relatedness) is present in dependent, histri- Psychoanalytic orientation, regardless of spe-
cific model, perhaps equips clinicians to han-onic, or borderline personality disorder; “in-
trojective pathology” (an exaggerated quest dle and make sense of particularly intense and
potentially disturbing human encounters. It isfor identity) is thought to characterize schiz-
oid, schizotypal, narcissistic, antisocial, or possible that the human understanding they
offer is more complex and psychologicallyavoidant individuals.
This person-centered approach deepens our deeper than other so-called omnibus theories
of human behavior (cognitive–behavioral, hu-understanding of psychiatric disturbance, as
categorized by DSM-IV, from a develop- manistic, systemic), even if psychoanalysis is
therapeutically no more effective than thesemental standpoint. For example, Blatt and
Bers (1993) differentiate two types of depres- other approaches. Interpersonal interactions
are complex, rapid, and beyond the capacitiession: a dependent (anaclitic) and a self-critical
(introjective) type. Thus depression in indi- of the conscious mind to monitor or effec-
tively guide beyond certain rudimentary strat-viduals with borderline personality disorder is
characterized by emptiness, loneliness, des- egies.
The work of Krause (1997) on the facialperation vis-a`-vis attachment figures, and la-
bile, diffuse affectivity. For nonborderline in- expression of affect in psychotherapy, for ex-
ample, demonstrated that the success ofdividuals with major depression, these aspects
correlate negatively with the severity of de- psychotherapy was indexed by a subliminal
affective interplay between therapist and pa-pression, whereas for borderline individuals
the same symptoms correlate almost perfectly tient. Congruent responses by the therapist
(the therapist’s tendency to match the pa-with severity within the limits of the reliabil-
ity of measurement (Rogers, Widiger, & tient’s affect) was consistently associated with
poor outcome. Complementary affective re-Krupp, 1995; Westen et al., 1992). Response
to treatment is powerfully predicted by this sponses (the therapist tends to manifest an af-
fect consistent with the patient’s words but in-distinction. For example, in the NIMH trial
(Blatt, Zuroff, Bondi, Sanislow, & Pilkonis, consistent with their facial display) predicted
good outcome. The association with outcome1998; Elkin, 1994), individuals with perfec-
tionism (introjective type) were unlikely to held for cognitive behavior therapy as
strongly as for psychodynamic treatment.improve after the first few sessions, whereas
patients with a high need for approval (ana- Therapists are only aware of these split-sec-
ond interchanges in terms of general subjec-clitic types) improved significantly in the sec-
ond half of the treatment (Blatt, Quinlan, Pil- tive impressions. Allowing such intuitions to
guide the therapeutic process is both the mostkonis, & Shea, 1995). The value of the
psychoanalytic approach is highlighted by the cherished preserve and the greatest burden of
the psychodynamic approach to treatment.fact that the majority of studies of depression
neither explores nor differentiates between The exploration of the limits of interpersonal
awareness in the context of therapy may bethese groups, although the experience of psy-
chological distress in the two groups is criti- the inherent appeal of psychoanalytic devel-
opmental ideas for clinicians, and may be partcally different. A person-centered approach
that takes the representational world as its fo- of the explanation for the continued popular-
ity of an approach which is so vulnerablecus is helpful in refining our predictions.
to criticisms on epistemic and empirical
grounds. The tapping and matching of theClose ties to interpersonal reality
sensitivity of the human mind as an instru-
ment for the scientific study of developmentAs psychoanalytic theory is rooted in clinical
practice, the experience of the therapist pro- remains a challenge for the next century.
vides a valuable vehicle for creating under-
The unique appeal of psychoanalysisstanding of thoughts, feelings, and behavior
that lie beyond the normal range of conscious To acknowledge the limitations of psychoana-
lytic epistemology is to tell but one half of aexperience and common sense psychology.
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remarkable story. Some of the greatest minds comprehensive picture of human psychologi-
cal growth.ever to become interested in the subject of
psychology, in particular the psychology of
mental disorders, have adopted the frame
Conclusionsof reference of psychoanalysis. We believe
they did so not because they were drawn to Psychoanalytic ideas remain radical and retain
an epistemology that was too loose to be able the potential to illuminate many aspects of de-
to reject new ideas but rather because psycho- velopmental psychopathology. Some major
analysis offered the richest and subtlest set of tasks for psychoanalytically oriented clini-
elements for describing the mind. cian–researchers are
A number of its characteristics suggest that
there is something important in this approach. (a) to move away from enumerative inductiv-
First, there is a great deal of generativity ism and develop closer links with the alter-
within the field. Psychoanalytic ideas have in- native data gathering methods available in
spired major psychological theories as well as modern social and biological science;
important lines of empirical investigation
(b) to define psychoanalytic constructs and(learned helplessness theory, schema theory,
techniques more tightly. This must includeattachment theory, aggression and hostility as
not only operational definitions but alsoa cause of psychosomatic conditions, self-
the “unpacking” of overarching concepts,serving cognitive distortions—termed defense
such as object relationships, and the speci-mechanisms by psychoanalysts—etc.). Sec-
fication of predictions: what remote orond, psychoanalytic theories frequently offer
proximal variables account for the emer-attractive unifying explanations of diverse
gence of specific symptoms, and what isovert behavior by postulating a single under-
the interaction among predisposing vari-lying covert anomaly. For example, why are
ables and other contributory factors?narcissistic individuals often forgetful of
names, prejudiced, inconsiderate of others’ (c) to develop a tradition of “comparative
time, and unable to remain in love? Psychoan- psychoanalytic studies,” where alternative
alytic accounts, whether self-psychological or frameworks are considered side by side in
based on other object relations views, attempt relation to the observations. This should be
to find a single explanation for such diverse extended so that explanations from outside
phenomena. Third, the psychoanalytic devel- psychoanalysis are considered, because
opmental approach is dynamic, seeing devel- they may suggest better or complementary
opment as a series of compromise formations. ways of understanding the data.
This gives depth, texture, and complexity to
(d) related to the above, to become more so-the developmental process, which—as we
phisticated in thinking about interactionshave tried to illustrate—is in line with new
between the intrapsychic world and the en-knowledge emerging from both neuroscience
vironment (Rutter, 1993) and the pro-and developmental psychopathology. Many
cesses of risk and trauma;psychoanalytic accounts provide satisfying
functionalist explanations of observed pat- (e) to give much greater consideration to the
terns of behavior and the observed character-
wider social and cultural context withinistics of mental representation. These char-
which object relations develop. For exam-
acteristics have supported developmental ple, placing the individuated self at thepsychopathology over the last quarter of a peak of a developmental hierarchy is eth-
century and will, we trust, continue to do so
nocentric, as well as pathologizing a modein the next.
of functioning that may be adaptive in cer-We have striven to show that, beyond gen- tain contexts.
eral characteristics, some specific insights of
psychoanalysis should be preserved if devel- (f) to focus on the relevance of psychoana-
lytic theory and treatment to the commu-opmental psychopathology is to retain its
Psychodynamic theory in developmental psychopathology 421
nity at large. For example, psychoanalytic more seriously could have a very beneficial
effect on epistemological and methodologicalstudies of multigenerational traumata have
principally focused on survivors of the aspects of developmental psychopathology.
This particularly applies to the central notionHolocaust (e.g., Kogan, 1995). Yet per-
that complex and, at times, conflicting repre-haps we could learn as much or more
sentations of unconscious beliefs and affectsabout this process from the study of Afri-
created early in life influence behavior andcan American communities in the United
experience throughout the lifetime. A widen-States, many of whose current problems
ing perspective could, for example, lead to acould be seen in the context of our failures
shift in emphasis from self-report to narrativein terms of their history in North America
data; to a closer examination of patterns ofas an enslaved group (e.g., Bass, Wyatt, &
narration, as opposed to observations of narra-Powell, 1982);
tive content; to a greater concern with dis-(g) to throw away the shackles of an over- cordance and conflict among response sys-
specified theory and focus on the essential tems, rather than a single-minded search for
components of psychoanalytic psychologi- congruence and consistency. Psychoanalytic
cal propositions. theory is alive, and its potential for enriching
our understanding of developmental psycho-
If psychoanalysis is able to meet these pathology has not been fully exploited in the
century that has just closed.challenges, then taking psychoanalytic ideas
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